At Digby Wells Environmental, our work across more than 300 resettlement projects in 77 countries has consistently shown that government is not just a stakeholder in resettlement. It is a structural force that often determines what is feasible. Even with extensive experience, recent projects have reminded us that the realities of government engagement demand deeper strategic thinking.
While early engagement, senior official support, and capacity-building are widely recognised as essentials, these elements must be considered within the broader political and institutional landscape. We regularly encounter entrenched power dynamics, conflicting departmental agendas, and a disconnect between national policy commitments and local implementation. Government officials often act based on internal positioning, career considerations, or departmental rivalries; factors that may have little to do with the project itself.
A South African project illustrated this vividly. Initially, our focus was on engaging mid-level officials, who we believed would be practically involved in implementation. This approach seemed logical. However, in retrospect, we realised that this strategy led to unproductive scrutiny and resistance. Many of these officials, eager to assert influence or prove their value, repeatedly questioned the project’s technical and procedural steps. What became clear is that early involvement of senior-level decision-makers, who were often more constructive and forward-looking, could have helped shape a more enabling environment and set a collaborative tone for their subordinates. The broader lesson is that actions taken by government officials are not always aligned with the content or quality of a project. Often, they are driven by agendas unrelated to the merits of the initiative, and while these agendas may not always be visible, they can exert significant influence over the engagement process.
Another layered challenge emerged in Ivory Coast, where district-level departments were tasked with conducting crop counts and land valuations. Beyond the technical coordination issues, we encountered capacity limitations and misaligned interdepartmental mandates. Building alignment required not only technical clarity, however ongoing relationship management and the flexibility to support institutional constraints. These were not roadblocks to be overcome once but realities to be managed over time.
A further complication arises when aligning projects to both international standards and national requirements. It is not enough to co-develop frameworks or aim for dual compliance; this is already expected. What often causes tension is government official concern that applying international standards may set a precedent, influencing the expectations for future state-led projects. One effective approach, as demonstrated by a large project our company undertook in Tanzania, is to clearly and consistently communicate the distinction: compensation measures required by national law are delivered as baseline, while enhancements required by international standards are clearly identified as additions. This clarity reduces resistance, as it signals that international provisions are project-specific, not precedent-setting for future public policy.
Ultimately, involving government in resettlement planning is not simply a procedural requirement. It is a process of navigating institutional complexity, anticipating political motivations, and maintaining transparency about standards and expectations. Effective partnerships are grounded not in ideal scenarios, however in a clear-eyed understanding of the system as it is. When approached with insight, patience, and intent, these engagements can foster outcomes that are both sustainable and credible; for governments, for project developers, and for affected communities.
